

























                                       
 1 Introduction
Causal inference based on experiments, which dates at least back to Neyman (1923) and Fisher
(1925, 1935), is a cornerstone of the evaluation of policy interventions. It has been used in
many di®erent ¯elds of research such as medicine, welfare policies, labor economics, eduction,
and development economics, see for instance the literature surveys in Du°o (2006), Harrison
and List (2004), and Imbens and Wooldridge (2009). If well conducted and appropriate to
the research question, experiments are widely regarded to be the most reliable source of causal
inference, see for instance Cochran and Chambers (1965), Freedman (2006), Rubin (2008), and
Imbens (2009), as they invoke a minimum of identifying assumptions. They neither impose
functional form assumptions as regression models nor particular correlations between observables
and unobservables which have to be assumed in observational studies. However, as any empirical
method, experiments are prone to attrition which may °aw the validity of the results, see the
discussion in Hausman and Wise (1979).
In this paper, we consider the problem that the outcome of interest is only partially observed
due to attrition, whereas the treatment and several socio-economic characteristics, which are
typically measured in baseline surveys prior to the intervention, are fully observed. The missing
outcome problem arises for instance when individuals with known pre-treatment characteristics
are randomly assigned to an active labor market policy (such as a training), but some of them
do not participate in a follow-up survey that measures labor market success (e.g., employment
or income) several months or years later due to reluctance or relocation. Similar problems are
inherent in clinical trials when some of the participants randomly assigned to medical treatments
pass away (`truncation by death') before the health outcome is measured. Finally, suppose
that high-school students are randomly provided with private school vouchers and that we are
interested in their scores obtained in college entrance examinations several years later. Attrition
in the outcome arises if a subsample of students decides not to take the exam.
Various remedies have been proposed to deal with attrition in outcome data. Multiple im-
1putation of missing values goes back to Rubin (1977, 1978), see also Rubin (1996) for a more
recent review. Based on Bayesian techniques, the idea is to use multiple attrition models to im-
pute multiple sets of plausible values for the missing data. This allows computing a probabil-
ity interval for the parameter of interest. Several studies use single imputation methods such as
regression adjustments to correct for attrition. E.g., Hausman and Wise (1979) use a probabil-
ity model of attrition in conjunction with a random e®ects model of individual response in their
evaluation of the Gary Income Maintenance experiment. Angrist, Bettinger, and Kremer (2006)
analyze the e®ects of school vouchers on college entrance examinations in Columbia and apply
tobit regression to control for the fact that voucher winners are more likely to take the exams
than voucher losers. Another approach is based on weighting observations according to their like-
lihood to respond, i.e., by the inverse of their conditional response probability, see for instance
Scharfstein, Rotnitzky, and Robins (1999). The idea of inverse probability weighting (IPW) goes
back to Horvitz and Thompson (1952), who ¯rst proposed an estimator of the population mean
in the presence of non-randomly missing data.
Barnard, Frangakis, Hill, and Rubin (2003) use a principal strati¯cation framework (see Fran-
gakis and Rubin, 2002) to estimate treatment e®ects under attrition (and further missing data
and non-compliance problems) by means of a parametric mixture model. Still based on principal
strati¯cation, Mealli and Pacini (2008) exploit discrete instruments to identify e®ects for partic-
ular subgroups under various assumptions. Finally, the estimation of nonparametric bounds (see
Horowitz and Manski, 1998, 2000) does not require a model for attrition at the cost of sacri¯cing
point identi¯cation even for particular subpopulations. Bounds on experimental treatment e®ects
have been estimated by Angrist, Bettinger, and Kremer (2006), Lee (2009), who evaluates the
e®ects of the Job Corps program on potential wages but observes the latter only conditional on
employment, and Grogger (2009), who assesses the e®ectiveness Connecticuts Jobs First experi-
ment and faces attrition due to relocation to a di®erent state. See also Zhang and Rubin (2003)
and Zhang, Rubin, and Mealli (2008) who discuss the identi¯cation of bounds in a principal strat-
i¯cation framework.
2This paper makes two contributions to the literature on attrition in social experiments.
Firstly, it reveals systematically under which forms of attrition - in terms of its relation
to observable or unobservable factors - experiments do (not) yield causal parameters, as a
comprehensive discussion on attrition in experiments and its implications for identi¯cation is
still lacking. Starting from a general treatment e®ect model, it makes explicit and formally
discusses under which conditions experiments identify average treatment e®ects on the entire
population and/or on the subpopulation of respondents.
Secondly, the paper shows how the di®erent forms of attrition can be controlled for by
IPW methods, i.e., by reweighing observations by the inverse of their conditional response
and/or treatment probabilities. Depending on whether attrition is related to all or subsets of
observable and unobservable variables, we will apply di®erent weighting approaches, each of
which is tailored to the speci¯c attrition problem at hand. This provides practitioners with
straightforward solutions depending on the suspected missing data problem.
The use of IPW to control for attrition related to observables, i.e., when outcomes are missing
at random (MAR, see Rubin 1976), is well established in the literature, see for instance Robins and
Rotnitzky (1995), Robins, Rotnitzky, and Zhao (1995), Rotnitzky and Robins (1995), Scharfstein,
Rotnitzky, and Robins (1999), and Wooldridge (2002, 2007). In contrast, the case when attrition
is related to unobservables such that identi¯cation requires an instrument for attrition (which
does not directly a®ect the outcome variable) has been widely ignored in experiments. One of the
very rare examples is DiNardo, McCrary, and Sanbonmatsu (2006) who use conventional sample
selection correction techniques based on regression, see Heckman (1976). The present work is the
¯rst that discusses the usefullness and application of IPW under attrition on unobservables in an
experimental context. This approach is closely related to Huber (2009), who uses IPW to control
for sample selection and attrition in observational studies.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces a general
treatment e®ect model along with attrition. Section 3 discusses identi¯cation under random at-
trition and attrition related to observables. Identi¯cation under attrition related to unobserv-
3ables is treated in Section 4. Section 5 presents simulation studies based on both generated and
empirical data. An application to a randomized introduction of a new health policy in Mexico is
provided in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Model
Let D denote a treatment indicator, either 1 (treatment) or 0 (non-treatment), which is randomly
assigned to an i.i.d. sample of n units, indexed by i = 1;:::;n. We are interested in the e®ect
of D on some outcome variable Y . Utilizing the potential outcome framework of Rubin (1974),
we denote the potential outcome for individual i and some hypothetical treatment D = d as Y d
i ,
where d 2 f0;1g. The di®erence Y 1
i ¡ Y 0
i would identify the individual treatment e®ect, but is
unknown to the researcher, because each individual is either treated or not treated and cannot
appear in both states of the world at the same time.
However, under particular assumptions a randomized experiment allows identifying treatment
e®ects by the fact that the potential outcomes are independent of the treatment assignment.
Throughout this paper we will therefore rule out any interaction e®ects between the individuals
participating in the experiment such as spill over, peer, or general equilibrium e®ects. This implies
the validity of the Stable Unit Treatment Valuation Assumption (SUTVA), see for instance Rubin
(1990). Furthermore, we will assume that that treatment compliance is perfect, i.e., everybody
being assigned takes the treatment, everybody not assigned does not. Even though we are fully
aware that interaction e®ects and noncompliance in experiments (see for instance Robins and
Tsiatis, 1991) do occur in practice, they are beyond the scope of this paper. In the subsequent
discussion we will exclusively focus on the identi¯cation problems related to attrition in the
outcome variable.
Under random treatment assignment the expected potential outcomes are equal to the
expected conditional outcomes given the treatment. Formally, E[Y d] = E[Y jD = d] for
d 2 f0;1g. Therefore, the average treatment e®ect (ATE), denoted as ¢, is identi¯ed by
4E[Y jD = 1] ¡ E[Y jD = 0] and is consistently estimated by the mean di®erence of treated
and nontreated outcomes in the sample. Causal inference becomes less straightforward when
the outcome variable is only partially observed due to attrition. The problems arising for
identi¯cation and the remedies that may be used depend on how attrition is related to the
treatment and the other parameters a®ecting the outcome.
To formally discuss the various forms of attrition, we consider a general treatment e®ect
model. Assume that the outcome Y is an unknown function of the treatment, a vector of observed
covariates X, and an unobserved term U.
Y = '(D;X;U); (1)
where '(¢) is a general function. Throughout this paper we will maintain that the treatment
is randomly assigned such that (X;U)?D, where `?' denotes independence. When using the
potential outcomes notation, this is implies that Y 1;Y 0?D. In Section 3, we will also assume
that X contains at least one continuously distributed variable. In Section 4, X may or may not
be continuous.
This model provides us with a useful framework for the evaluation of policy interventions.
Consider for instance the identi¯cation of the e®ect of vouchers for private schooling (D) to
which high school students are randomly assigned on test scores in college entrance examinations
(Y ) several years later. Empirical evidence suggests that private schooling has an e®ect on test
scores, see Angrist, Bettinger, and Kremer (2006). Thus, we suspect the test scores to be a
function of the treatment, but also of observed baseline characteristics (X) such as age and
gender, which are usually provided in surveys accompanying randomized trials. Furthermore,
also unobserved factors U such as motivation most likely in°uence the test scores. As a second
example, consider labor market experiments where individuals are randomly assigned into a
training, see for instance Bloom, Orr, Bell, Cave, Doolittle, Lin, and Bos (1997). The labor
market outcomes (Y ), e.g., employment, unemployment, or income, are a function of training
5(D), socio-economic characteristics like age, education, and gender (X), and unobservables (U)
such as innate ability.
To introduce attrition into our framework, let R denote a binary response variable which is
1 if Y is observed (non-attrition) and 0 otherwise. In contrast, we will assume that (X;D) is
observed for all individuals. The fact that only Y jR = 1 is known instead of Y may °aw the
validity of experimental results. The experiment bears external validity if it identi¯es the ATE
on the entire population (¢ = E[Y 1]¡E[Y 0]) in spite of attrition. It bears internal validity if the
ATE on the respondents, ¢R=1 = E[Y 1jR = 1] ¡ E[Y 0jR = 1], is identi¯ed. Whether external
and/or internal validity holds depends on the nature of attrition. The following two sections
will impose di®erent assumptions on the relation between attrition and observed and unobserved
factors in the treatment e®ect model and will discuss the implications for identi¯cation. When
identi¯cation fails, we will propose IPW methods to correct for attrition bias and also discuss the
required conditions.
3 Identi¯cation under random attrition and attrition related to
observables
The most innocuous form of attrition is the case when outcomes are missing completely at random
(MCAR), see for instance Rubin (1976) and Heitjan and Basu (1996). MCAR says that attrition
is not related with any observed or unobserved parameter in the treatment e®ect model. After
considering this benchmark case we will systematically investigate more severe attrition problems.
Assumption 1: R is random.
R?(D;X;U):
Assumption 1 states that attrition is independent of both observed and unobserved variables.
This implies that the potential outcomes are independent of the response mechanism, Y 1;Y 0?R,
6and that the potential outcomes and the response mechanism are jointly independent of the
treatment assignment, (Y 1;Y 0;R)?D. To see the implications for identi¯cation, note that the
potential outcome under treatment D = d for individual i is Y d
i ´ '(d;Xi;Ui) for d 2 f0;1g.








where the ¯rst equality follows from Assumption 1 and the second from random assignment.





= E[Y jD = 1;R = 1] ¡ E[Y jD = 0;R = 1] = E[Y jD = 1] ¡ E[Y jD = 0]
= E[Y 1] ¡ E[Y 0] = ¢:
As a ¯rst deviation from MCAR, we will now assume that response is a function of the treat-
ment, but not of any other parameter in the treatment e®ect model.
Assumption 2: R is a function of D and a random component V .
(2a) R = If³(D;V ) ¸ 0g,
(2b) V ?(X;U):
If¢g denotes the indicator function and ³(¢) is a general function. We assume V to be an un-
observed term that is independent of (X;U), see (2b). By (2a), D shifts R such that Pr(D =
1jR = 1) 6= Pr(D = 1jR = 0). As D also a®ects Y , it follows that E[Y jR = 1] 6= E[Y ] because
the share of treated individuals changes due to attrition. However, this does not a®ect identi¯ca-
tion, because the distribution of (X;U) is not related to the response behavior. This implies that
(Y 1;Y 0;R1;R0)?D, where Rd denotes the hypothetical response for D = d, and Y 1;Y 0?RjD.







where the ¯rst equality follows from Assumption 2 and the second from random assignment. The
experiment is again externally valid and identi¯es the ATE.
The forms of attrition considered under Assumptions 1 and 2 are unlikely to hold in many,
if not most social experiments. Empirical evidence suggests that response behavior is often
related to the treatment and other observed characteristics, see for instance Hausman and Wise
(1979), Fitzgerald, Gottschalk, and Mo±tt (1998), and Grilo, Money, Barlow, Goddard, Gorman,
Hofmann, Papp, Shear, and Woods (1998). These characteristics X are typically measured in
baseline surveys prior to the intervention and commonly include gender, age, education, and other
socio-economic variables.
In the remainder of this section, we will assume that response is a function of the treatment
and the covariates. In a ¯rst step, we impose a very particular relationship between X and D,
namely independence conditional on response. This case is primarily chosen for illustrative rea-
sons rather than practical relevance. Interestingly, it entails internal validity of the experiment
while external validity does no longer hold without controlling for attrition.
Assumption 3: R is a function of D, X, and V .
(3a) R = If³(D;X;V ) ¸ 0g,
(3b) V ?(X;U);
(3c) X?DjR = 1:
By Assumption 3, attrition a®ects the distributions of D and X, which are, however, not re-
lated to each other even conditional on response, see (3c). This implies that the distributional
change in X is equal across treatment states. As U does not a®ect the response the joint distri-




'(d;X;U)dFX;UjR=1. The mean potential outcome of respondents is equal to the average con-
8ditional outcome given D = d among respondents. Therefore, the experiment identi¯es the ATE





= E[Y jD = 1;R = 1] ¡ E[Y jD = 0;R = 1] = E[Y 1jR = 1] ¡ E[Y 0jR = 1] = ¢R=1:
However, it is not externally valid, which would require that ¢R=1 = ¢. The latter does not






Under certain conditions, the ATE on the entire population is identi¯ed by weighting respon-
dents according to the likelihood that their observed characteristics appear in the entire popula-
tion. To this end, we de¯ne the response propensity score (see Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983), i.e.,
the conditional response probability given (D;X), as p(D;X) ´ Pr(R = 1jD;X). Furthermore,
we impose the following common support restriction:
Assumption 3': Positive response propensity score.
Pr(R = 1jD = d;X = x) > c for all x 2 X, d 2 f0;1g, c > 0.
X denotes the support of X. Assumption 3' states that for any (X;D), the response probability
must be bounded away from zero, otherwise outcomes are never observed for particular combi-
nations of the treatment and the covariates. This allows us to reestablish external validity of the
experiment by IPW as suggested in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1














Proof: See Appendix A.1.
9Thus, weighting observations by the inverse of their respective response propensity score identi¯es
the ATE. The idea of using IPW to control for attrition or similar selection problems goes back to
Horvitz and Thompson (1952), who proposed an estimator of the population mean when data are
missing non-randomly. IPW has been frequently applied when the attrition process is assumed to
depend only on observables, i.e., when outcomes are missing at random (MAR) in the notation
of Rubin (1976). Formally, the MAR requires that Pr(R = 1jD;X;Y ) = Pr(R = 1jD;X), or
equivalently, that Y ?RjD;X. E.g., Robins and Rotnitzky (1995), Robins, Rotnitzky, and Zhao
(1995), Rotnitzky and Robins (1995), and Scharfstein, Rotnitzky, and Robins (1999) use IPW to
adjust for missing data in regression models. Wooldridge (2002) considers IPW M-estimation of
missing data models and Proposition 1 ¯ts into his general framework as a special case.
To make our framework more general, we relax Assumption 3 somewhat by omitting Assump-
tion (3c). This allows the gradient of X on the response to di®er across treatment states. E.g.,
one could imagine that in a school voucher experiment, private schools (D = 1) are equally suc-
cessful in sending younger and older students (X=age) to college entrance examinations (R = 1),
whereas public schools (D = 0) more likely send older students. This would change the distribu-
tion of X across treatments among test takers.
Assumption 4: R is a function of D, X, and V .







nal validity does no longer hold because the distribution of X generally di®ers across treatment







'(d;X;U)dFUjX=x for all x 2 X;
where the ¯rst equality follows from the randomness of response conditional on (X;D) implied
10by Assumption 4, which satis¯es MAR, and the second from the random assignment. Note that
this would also hold if we relaxed (4b) somewhat to V ?UjX.
It follows that the mean potential outcome among respondents is
Z Z
'(d;X;U)dFUjD=d;X=x;R=1dFXjR=1:
This allows us to identify the ATE on the respondents and to reestablish internal validity. Sim-
ilarly to the response propensity score, we de¯ne the treatment propensity score among respon-
dents, i.e., the conditional treatment probability given X, as ¼(X) ´ Pr(D = 1jX;R = 1) and
impose the following common support assumption:
Assumption 4': Common support in the treatment propensity scores.
c < Pr(D = 1jX = x) < 1 ¡ c for all x 2 X, d 2 f0;1g, c > 0.
Assumption 4 states that the treatment propensity score is bounded away from 0 and 1, which
rules out arbitrarily large weights in the subsequent proposition that reestablishes internal valid-
ity of the experiment.
Proposition 2











Proof: See Appendix A.2.
By reweighing the outcomes of respondents by the inverse of the (non-)treatment propensity
score, we control for di®erences in the distributions of X across treatment states to identify
¢R=1. This is analogous to the application of IPW in a `selection on observables' or `conditional
independence' framework, see for instance Hirano, Imbens, and Ridder (2003), which also adjusts
11for di®erences in X that, however, exist even prior to attrition.
Under somewhat stronger common support conditions we can also identify the ATE on the
entire population and reestablish external validity. To this end, note that the mean potential in
the entire population is
Z Z
'(d;X;U)dFUjD=d;X=x;R=1dFX:
I.e., integrating over the distribution of X in the entire population identi¯es the potential out-
comes and the ATE. As for Proposition 1, this requires that the response probability is bounded
away from zero for any (X;D).
Proposition 3
Under Assumptions 3', 4, and 4', the ATE is identi¯ed by
¢ = E
·
R ¢ D ¢ Y
p(D;X) ¢ ¼(X)
¡
R ¢ (1 ¡ D) ¢ Y
p(D;X) ¢ (1 ¡ ¼(X))
¸
: (4)
Proof: See Appendix A.3.
¢ is identi¯ed by using ¼(X) to adjust for di®erences in the distributions of X across D
among respondents and p(D;X) to control for di®erences in (D;X) between respondents and
non-respondents. Note that the strong Assumption (4b) may be replaced by the less severe
restriction V ?UjD;X, which might be considerably more plausible in empirical applications.
Even then, response is random conditional on (D;X), MAR is satis¯ed, and Propositions 2 and
3 still apply.
4 Identi¯cation under attrition related to unobservables
In the last section we considered various forms of attrition related to observables. In our treat-
ment e®ect model, MAR requires that U and V , the unobserved terms in the outcome and re-
12sponse equations, are independent, at least conditional on observed characteristics. This assump-
tion will be no longer maintained in this section. Instead, we will assume attrition on unobserv-
ables by allowing for a nonzero correlation between U and V even conditional on D;X. Analo-
gous to sample selection models (see Heckman 1974, 1976, 1979) - at least when identi¯cation is
nonparametric (e.g., Das, Newey, and Vella, 2003, Newey, 2007, and Huber, 2009) - point identi-
¯cation hinges on the availability of an instrument that a®ects response but has no direct e®ect
on the outcome.
Reconsider for instance the identi¯cation of the e®ect of school vouchers assigned by a lottery
on test scores in college entrance examinations. If only a subpopulation takes the test and
the participation probability is a function of unobserved motivation that is also correlated with
tests scores even conditional on the treatment and observed characteristics as age, identi¯cation
requires an instrument that in°uences test participation but has no direct e®ect on the test scores.
Assumption 5: Attrition related to unobservables.
(5a) R = If³(D;X;Z) ¸ V g,
(5b) Cov(U;V ) 6= 0 (and Cov(U;V ) 6= 0jD;X)
By Assumption 5, R is a function of one element that is excluded in ', namely the instrument Z.
Due to the non-zero covariance of V and U, the e®ect of D on Y among respondents is confounded
even conditional on X. Identi¯cation requires Z to be a good predictor for R, to contain at least
one continuous element, and not to have a direct e®ect on the outcome. The following restrictions
guarantee the validity of the instrument.
Assumption 5': Instrument for the response probability.
(5'a) Cov(Z;RjX;D) 6= 0 and Y ?ZjD;X,
(5'b) Pr(R = 1jD = d) > c, c > 0, d 2 f1;0g,
(5'c) (U;V )?(D;Z),
13(5'd) FV (t), the cdf of V , is strictly monotonic in the argument t.
(5'a) states that Z shifts R but is not directly related with Y . (5'b) rules out that being treated
or nontreated predicts attrition perfectly. To see the usefulness of this assumption, assume the
opposite such that units with D = 0 do never respond independent of the values of (X;Z).
Obviously, the treatment e®ect cannot be evaluated as no comparisons with D = 0 are available
in the subpopulation of respondents.
By (5'c), we impose that D;Z are jointly independent of the unobservables (U;V ). Indepen-
dence between (U;V ) and D is satis¯ed by the randomization of the treatment if V is not a post-
treatment variable. Still, it needs to be plausibly argued that (U;V )?Z. E.g., let us assume that
we want to investigate the e®ect of a randomized training on the potential wages (Y ) of married
women. If only those report their potential wages who actually work (R = 1), we only observe
Y jR = 1. Non-wife income appears to be a valid instrument for female labor force participation
if it is not related to unobserved motivation or ability. However, Assumption (5'c) is violated if
the distribution of motivation and ability (and thus, of potential wages) di®ers for women with
di®erent levels of non-wife income. This may be the case if more motivated and more able women
tend to have more motivated and more able spouses with a higher wage potential.
As also argued by DiNardo, McCrary, and Sanbonmatsu (2006), the instrument should ideally
be randomly assigned in a similar way as the treatment. This would plausibly justify Assumption
(5'c). E.g., in a follow-up telephone survey, Z may be the number of phone calls per experimental
unit which is randomized prior to the treatment assignment. A higher number of attempted calls
should increase the response probability while being unrelated with other factors under random
assignment. Also ¯nancial incentives are likely to a®ect response behavior, see Castiglioni, Pforr,
and Krieger (2008). Note that (5'c) could be relaxed to (U;V )?(D;Z)jX, which might be more
plausible in applications without randomized instruments.
Note that Pr(S = 1jD;X;Z) = Pr(³(D;X;Z) ¸ V ) = FV (³(D;X;Z)). By the monotonicity
assumption (5'd) the likelihood to respond increases monotonically in ³. Monotonicity is implic-
14itly assumed in any linear index restriction frequently used in the parametric sample selection
literature, see Heckman (1974, 1976, 1979) . It allows us to back out the distribution of V by
pinning down (D;X;Z). By comparing individuals with the same response propensity score, we
control for V and thus, also for the dependence between V and U. I.e., by ¯xing V , we rule
out confounding of the treatment e®ect due to attrition related to unobservables. The response
propensity score serves as a control function where the exogenous variation comes from Z. Con-
trol functions have been applied in semi- and nonparametric sample selection models, e.g., Ahn
and Powell (1993) and Das, Newey, and Vella (2003) as well as in nonparametric models with
endogeneity, see, for example, Newey, Powell, and Vella (1999), Blundell and Powell (2003), and
Imbens and Newey (2003).
However, conditioning on the response propensity score alone does not su±ce for causal infer-
ence. A ¯rst reason is that similar to Assumption 4, response is a function of X and D. There-
fore, random treatment assignment does not necessarily entail independence of D and X among
respondents as the distribution of X might di®er across treatment states conditional on R = 1.
Secondly, this is even more likely to be the case conditional on the response propensity score. To
see this, note that individuals in di®erent treatment states D but equal values in X and Z must
have distinct response propensity scores. I.e., Pr(R = 1jD = 1;X = x;Z = z) 6= Pr(R = 1jD =
0;X = x;Z = z). As we need to compare treated and nontreated individuals with identical re-
sponse propensity scores to control for the attrition bias, these individuals necessarily di®er with
respect to (X;Z). Despite the randomization of the treatment in the entire population, identi-
¯cation requires conditioning on both the response propensity score and the covariates among
respondents which will be discussed more formally below.
For notational ease, let W ´ (D;X;Z) and the response propensity score p(W) ´ Pr(R =
1jD;X;Z). If Assumption (5'c) holds, U and D are independent conditional on p(W) and X,
which can be shown analogously to the proof of Theorem 1 in Newey (2007). Let a(U) denote
15any bounded function of U. Note that fR = 1g = fF¡1
V (p(W)) ¸ V g. Then,
E [a(U)jD;X;p(W);R = 1] = E
£
E [a(U)jV;D;X;Z]jD;X;p(W);F¡1










V (p(W)) ¸ v
¤
= E [E [a(U)jV;X;p(W)]jX;p(W);R = 1]
= E [a(U)jX;p(W);R = 1];
where the ¯rst equality follows from iterated expectations, the second and third from (5'c), and
the last from a backward application of the law of iterated expectations.
Thus, treatment e®ects are identi¯ed by conditioning on the response propensity score and
the covariates. To see this, note that the conditional ATE given X and p(W) conditional on







= E[Y 1jX = x;p(W) = p(w);R = 1] ¡ E[Y 0jX = x;p(W) = p(w);R = 1]:
E[Y djX = x;p(W) = p(w);R = 1] is the expected potential outcome for a hypothetical treatment
d given X and p(W) among respondents. By the conditional independence of U and D given
p(W) and X, it holds that






= E[Y jD = d;X = x;p(W) = p(w);R = 1]:
Hence, the expected potential outcome is equal to the expected conditional outcome given D = d.
16The ATE on respondents ¢R=1 is identi¯ed by the integration over the marginal distributions of
X and p(W) in the subpopulation with observed outcomes.
Z Z
[E[Y jD = 1;X = x;p(W) = p(w);R = 1]
¡E[Y jD = 0;X = x;p(W) = p(w);R = 1]]dFxjp(W)=p(w);R=1dFp(w)jR=1
=
Z Z
[E[Y 1jX = x;p(W) = p(w);R = 1]
¡E[Y 0jX = x;p(W) = p(w);R = 1]]dFxjp(W)=p(w);R=1dFp(w)jR=1
= E[Y 1 ¡ Y 0jR = 1] = ¢R=1: (5)
Therefore, the identi¯cation of ¢R=1 hinges on the common support of the treatment in X and
p(W). ¢ is not identi¯ed without further assumptions, see also Newey (2007), as Y is not even
observed when R = 0. However, under the additional restrictions that the response propensity
score is positive for any (X;p(W)) and that Y is homoscedastic conditional on (D;X) one can
even identify the ATE on the entire population. To this end, we impose the following assumption:
Assumption 5": Common support and separability.
(5"a) Pr(R = 1jD = d;X = x;Z = z) > c; c > 0; for all x 2 X, for all Z 2 Z,
(5"b) c < Pr(D = 1jX = x;p(W) = p(w)) < 1 ¡ c, for all x 2 X, for all p(w) 2 P, c > 0,
(5"c) Y = '(D;X) + U.
Z;P denote the support regions of Z and p(W). Note that (5"a) is stronger than (5'b). E®ects
on the entire population could not be identi¯ed if there existed individuals with a response
propensity score equal to zero as this would rule out suitable comparisons in the subpopulation
of respondents. (5"c) decreases the generality of our model due to separability of the observed
and unobserved terms, see also Das, Newey, and Vella (2003), but ensures homoscedasticity of
Y given (D;X). This is required for the identi¯cation of ¢, as outlined further below. Similar
to the last section, let ¼(X;p(W)) denote the treatment propensity score, ¼(X;p(W)) ´ Pr(D =
171jX;p(W);R = 1). Propositions 4 and 5 show identi¯cation of the ATEs on the respondents and
on the entire population.
Proposition 4














Proof: See Appendix A.4.
By weighting observations by the inverse of the (non-)treatment propensity score, we adjust
for di®erences in the distributions of X and p(W) between treated and nontreated respondents.
Proposition 4 is similar to Proposition 3, with the exception that we have to additionally condition
on the response propensity score in the treatment propensity score to control for attrition on
unobservables. It becomes immediately obvious that this approach is di®erent to Mealli and
Pacini (2008) who control for attrition in experiments by conditioning on a (discrete) instrument
directly, rather than p(W). Under certain conditions they identify treatment e®ects for particular
subgroups. As we assume a continuous instrument, we can even identify the ATE on the entire
population, given that there is common support in the propensity scores.
Proposition 5
Under Assumptions 5, 5', and 5", the ATE is identi¯ed by
¢ = E
·





R ¢ (1 ¡ D) ¢ Y
p(W) ¢ (1 ¡ ¼(X;p(W)))
¸
: (7)
Proof: See Appendix A.5.
The ATE on the entire population is identi¯ed based on reweighing observations (in addition to
the inverse treatment propensity score) by the inverse of the response propensity score, i.e., by
using the relative likelihood of a particular triple (D;X;Z) to appear in the entire population, as
weighting function.
18This result may seem surprising given the fact that outcomes are only partially observed and
observed outcomes do generally not allow inferring on the unobserved outcomes. I.e., E[Y jD =
d;X = x;p(W) = p(w);R = 1] 6= E[Y jD = d;X = x;p(W) = p(w);R = 0] due to di®erent
conditional distributions of the unobserved term U. Nevertheless, Assumptions (5') and (5")
imply that ¢R=1(x;p(w)) = ¢R=0(x;p(w)). To see this, note that FUjD=d;X=x;p(W)=p(w);R=r =













¢R=1(x;p(w)) and ¢R=0(x;p(w)) only di®er with respect to the integrals over di®erent condi-
tional distributions of U given R = 1 and R = 0, which cancel out in the subtractions by (5"c).
Thus, ¢R=1(x;p(w)) = ¢R=0(x;p(w)). Therefore, reweighing the conditional treatment e®ects
of the respondents according to the distribution of (D;X;Z) in the entire population identi¯es
¢.
For completeness, we will brie°y discuss identi¯cation under a particular deviation from the
previous model, assuming that response is a function of D, Z, and V , but is not related with the
covariates X.
Assumption 6: Attrition related to unobservables.
(6a) R = If³(D;Z) ¸ V g,
(6b) Cov(U;V ) 6= 0
Under this particular form of attrition the response behavior is merely a function of the treatment
and unobservables, but unrelated to the observed covariates. Whether Assumption 6 is plausible
19depends on the evaluation problem at hand and may even be tested (by testing the explanatory
power of X on R). The response propensity score is now p(D;Z) ´ Pr(R = 1jD;Z). We impose
the following instrumental variable and common support assumptions.
Assumption 6': Instrument for response probability.
(6'a) Cov(Z;RjD) 6= 0 and Y ?ZjD,
(6'b) Pr(R = 1jD = d) > c, c > 0, d 2 f1;0g,
(6'c) (X;U;V )?(D;Z),
(6'd) FV (t), the cdf of V , is strictly monotonic in the argument t.
Assumption 6": Common support in the response and treatment propensity scores.
(6"a) Pr(R = 1jD = d;Z = z) > c; c > 0; for all x 2 X, for all Z 2 Z,
(6"b) c < Pr(D = 1jp(D;Z) = p(d;z)) < 1 ¡ c, for all x 2 X, for all p(d;z) 2 P, c > 0,
(6"c) Y = '(D;X) + U.
Assumption 6' and 6" are straightforward modi¯cations of 5',5", with the exception of 6'c, which
assumes independence of the (D;Z) also w.r.t. X. Again, the treatment is independent by
randomization, whereas the independence of Z and X may or may not be plausible and might be
tested. By Assumptions 6, 6'c, and random treatment assignment, it holds that X is independent
of D conditional on p(D;Z) and R = 1, because FXjD;p(D;Z);R=1 = FXjD = FX. Therefore,
treatment e®ects are identi¯ed conditional on p(D;Z) or on the simpli¯ed treatment propensity
score ¼(p(D;Z)) ´ Pr(D = 1jp(D;Z)), respectively. Similar to Propositions 4 and 5, the ATEs
on the respondents and the entire population can be expressed by the following equations:
Proposition 6














Proof: See Appendix A.6.
20Proposition 7
Under Assumptions 6, 6', and 6", the ATE is identi¯ed by
¢ = E
·





R ¢ (1 ¡ D) ¢ Y
p(D;Z) ¢ (1 ¡ ¼(p(D;Z)))
¸
: (9)
Proof: See Appendix A.7.
In the last two sections we have covered several forms of attrition and provided a guideline
on which weighting methods are appropriate under speci¯c assumptions. In particular, the use of
IPW incorporating instrumental variables when attrition is on unobservables has been discussed,
a case widely ignored in the experimental literature. Even though Sections 3 and 4 aim at covering
cases that are relevant in many empirical applications, the discussion is not exhaustive, as one
can think of many di®erent ways of modeling response behavior in experiments.
We conclude this section by brie°y reviewing a somewhat di®erent identifying restriction
recently proposed by Imai (2009), which he calls the `non-ignorability assumption'. The latter
implies conditional independence of the treatment and the response in an experiment:
Pr(R = 1jD = 1;Y = y;X = x) = Pr(R = 1jD = 0;Y = y;X = x);
or, equivalently,
R?DjY;X:
I.e., conditional on the outcome and observed characteristics, response does not depend on the
treatment, whereas R is allowed to be related with Y , e.g., through a correlation of U and
V when considering the treatment e®ect model. As the author argues, this is plausible when
response behavior is strongly driven by the outcome variable (e.g. voters may be more willing
to participate in post-election surveys than non-voters), whereas the treatment represents only a
21mild intervention that is unlikely to a®ect attrition (e.g., a psychological voting stimulus). Imai
provides a method that identi¯es the ATE under the non-ignorability assumption and applies it
to a German election experiment.
5 Simulation studies
In this section, we run a horse race between the experimental mean di®erence estimator not
controlling for attrition and IPW estimators assuming that attrition is related to observables and
unobservables as treated under Assumptions 4 and 5, respectively. For this reason, we conduct
simulation studies based on both generated and empirical data. Starting with the former scenario,
we consider the following data generating process (DGP):
Yi = ®1Di + ®2Xi + ®2DiXi + Ui;
Yi is observed if Ri = 1;
Ri = If¯1Di + ¯2Xi + ¯3Zi + Vi > 0g:
Apart from the treatment D, the covariate X, and the unobserved term U, the outcome Y also
depends on an interaction term of D and X, which introduces e®ect heterogeneity with respect
to X. X and Z are uniformly distributed with support regions [¡1;1] and [¡1;2], respectively.
D is Bernoulli and either 1 or 0 with equal probability. (U;V ) are drawn from a multivariate
standard normal distribution. Their covariance is set to zero in the case of attrition on observables
and to 0:8 under attrition on unobservables. The coe±cients in the outcome equation are set to
®1 = ®2 = 1;®3 = 0:25. Under attrition on observables ¯1 = ¯2 = 1 and ¯3 = 0. Under attrition
on unobservables, ¯1 = ¯2 = 0:5 and ¯3 = 1, i.e., R is also a function of the instrument Z which
is excluded from the outcome equation.
We use normalized versions (such that weights add up to unity, see Imbens, 2004, and Busso,
DiNardo, and McCrary, 2009b) of the sample analogs of Propositions 4 and 5 as estimators of
22the ATE on the entire population (denoted as ^ ¢) and on the respondents (^ ¢R=1). The response
and treatment propensity scores p(W);¼(X;p(W)) are speci¯ed as probit models. We run 1999
Monte Carlo simulations for two di®erent sample sizes (n = 500;2000) and compare the accuracy
of IPW estimators to simply taking mean di®erences of treated and nontreated outcomes among
respondents.
The following two tables report the results for untrimmed IPW estimators as hardly any
propensity score estimate in any Monte Carlo replication is close to the boundaries of 0 and 1.
Therefore, methods incorporating propensity score trimming (see for instance Busso, DiNardo,
and McCrary, 2009a, and Crump, Hotz, Imbens, and Mitnik, 2009) yield virtually the same
results and are omitted in the paper, but available upon request.
Table 1: Attrition on observables, simulated data
n=500
^ ¢ bias s.e. MSE ^ ¢R=1 bias s.e. MSE
IPW obs 1.001 0.001 0.180 0.032 0.998 -0.002 0.112 0.012
mean di®erence 0.883 -0.117 0.135 0.032 0.851 -0.149 0.130 0.039
true e®ect (normalized) 1.000 1.000
n=2000
^ ¢ bias s.e. MSE ^ ¢R=1 bias s.e. MSE
IPW obs 1.000 0.000 0.087 0.008 0.998 -0.002 0.056 0.003
mean di®erence 0.882 -0.118 0.066 0.018 0.849 -0.151 0.064 0.027
true e®ect (normalized) 1.000 1.000
Note: 1999 Monte Carlo replications. `IPW obs' controls for attrition related to observables.
All e®ects are normalized to 1.
Table 1 displays the estimates, bias, standard errors (s.e.) and mean squared errors (MSE)
for the di®erent methods when attrition is related to observables. Note that the ATEs on the
entire population and on the respondents are normalized to unity. The IPW estimators following
from Propositions 2 and 3 are e®ective in controlling for attrition bias. ^ ¢; ^ ¢R=1 are close to the
true values and their accuracy in terms of MSE increases in the sample size. In contrast, the
mean di®erence estimator is substantially biased. For the estimation of the ATE on the entire
population under the smaller sample size it is, however, competitive in terms of the MSE. This
is due to its smaller variance compared to IPW, which introduces additional uncertainty through
the estimation of two propensity scores. Under the larger sample size, the persistence of the bias
23of the mean di®erence estimator dominates its better precision, such that IPW is clearly superior.
Many, and in particular a lot of recently conducted social experiments exceed the sample sizes
considered in the simulations and typically contain several thousand observations, e.g., Angrist,
Bettinger, and Kremer (2006), Angrist and Lavy (2009), Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004),
Gertler (2004), and Krueger and Zhu (2004), or even more (Karlan and List, 2007). Simulation
results suggest that IPW is likely to reduce the MSE under non-random attrition when using
such su±ciently large data sets.
Table 2 displays the results for IPW estimators (i) controlling for attrition on unobservables
(`IPW unobs', following from Propositions 4 and 5) and (ii) observables alone (`IPW obs', fol-
lowing from Propositions 2 and 3) when response depends also on unobservables. The former
methods exploiting the instrument entail only moderate biases and MSEs, whereas the accuracy
of IPW only controlling for attrition on observables is considerably lower. When estimating the
ATE on the entire population, `IPW obs' performs even worse than the mean di®erence estima-
tor. This suggests that omitting important factors in a model for attrition may be worse than
not controlling for response bias at all.
Table 2: Attrition on unobservables, simulated data
n=500
^ ¢ bias s.e. MSE ^ ¢R=1 bias s.e. MSE
IPW unobs 0.974 -0.026 0.118 0.015 1.009 0.009 0.110 0.012
IPW obs 0.780 -0.220 0.108 0.060 0.898 -0.102 0.098 0.020
mean di®erence 0.891 -0.109 0.118 0.026 0.878 -0.122 0.116 0.028
true e®ect (normalized) 1.000 1.000
n=2000
^ ¢ bias s.e. MSE ^ ¢R=1 bias s.e. MSE
IPW unobs 0.979 -0.021 0.059 0.004 1.014 0.014 0.054 0.003
IPW obs 0.783 -0.217 0.055 0.050 0.900 -0.100 0.049 0.012
mean di®erence 0.892 -0.108 0.059 0.015 0.879 -0.121 0.058 0.018
true e®ect (normalized) 1.000 1.000
Note: 1999 Monte Carlo replications. `IPW unobs' controls for attrition related to observables and unobservables,
`IPW obs' only for attrition related to observables. All e®ects are normalized to 1.
To illustrate the potential gains of IPW in empirical applications when attrition is related to
unobservables, we use a publicly available subsample of Tennessee's Project STAR Experiment
for the subsequent simulation study based on empirical data. Project STAR was conducted in
24the mid-1980s to evaluate the e®ects of small class sizes (target 13-17 students instead of 22-25
students in regular classes) in kindergartens and schools on student achievement, see for example
Finn and Achilles (1990, 1999) and Krueger (1999). Our data set contains 5,852 children of which
1,757 were randomly assigned to a small class in kindergarten. The outcome of interest (Y ) is
the Stanford Achievement Test (SAT) in maths at the end of the kindergarten year (average test
score: 485.377, standard deviation: 47.698).
A major issue for the applicability of the proposed IPW methods under attrition related to
unobservables is the requirement of a continuous instrument. Therefore, future experimental
designs might consider the inclusion of (close to) continuous instruments which should ideally
be randomly assigned in a similar way as the treatment. As mentioned before, the number of
phone calls could be used to instrument the response rate to post-treatment surveys. Up to date,
however, such variables are typically not available in social experiments (see for instance Lee,
2009), and this is also the case for Project STAR. For this reason we will pursue a somewhat
unorthodox simulation approach to investigate the performance of IPW when estimating the ATE
on the entire population under attrition related to unobservables.
We discard all observations assigned to a small class in kindergarten and treat the sample of
controls (n = 4;095) as if it was the entire population of interest. Moreover, we randomly assign
a binary placebo treatment D among the controls with a `treatment probability' of 0.5. Thus,
the true treatment e®ect is known to be zero. Furthermore, the experiment is arti¯cially broken
by the introduction of the following response process, which is designed such that roughly two
thirds of the outcomes are observed:
Ri = If¯0 + ¯1Di + ¯2Xi ¡ ¯3Zi ¡ ¯4Ui + Vi > 0g;
where ¯0 = 2:5;¯1 = ¯2 = ¯3 = 1;¯4 = 2. X denotes race (one if white and zero otherwise) which
we treat as being observed. U represents socio-economic status (one if eligible for free lunches,
zero otherwise) and is assumed not to be observed for the sake of the subsequent simulation.
25The only generated variables apart from the treatment are the instrument Z (uniform, support
[¡1:5;1:5]) and the error term V (standard normal).
An inspection of the data shows that both X and U are strongly correlated with Y . Thus,
neglecting attrition supposedly biases estimation. Note, however, that the exact structural rela-
tion between race, socio-economic status, and the SAT score is unknown due to the use of the
empirical data. This is fundamentally di®erent to the conventional Monte Carlo design (see the
previous simulations) where the outcome equation is explicitly modeled. The motivation for us-
ing empirical data is to conduct simulations that are more closely linked to real world problems
and, thus, more credible than studies merely based on generated data. Simulations relying on
empirical data can also be found in Bertrand, Du°o, and Mullainathan (2004), Diamond and
Sekhon (2006), Huber, Lechner, and Wunsch (2010b), and Lee and Whang (2010).
In each of the 1999 Monte Carlo replications, (Y;X;U) are randomly drawn from the `pop-
ulation' without replacement and (D;Z;V ) from their respective distributions in order to com-
pute R. Then, we estimate the response propensity score by regressing R on (1;D;X;Z) and the
treatment propensity score, which is unknown in our simulation due to the use of empirical data,
by regressing D on (1;X; ^ p(W);X £ ^ p(W)) using probit speci¯cations. Contrary to the previ-
ous simulations, we estimate the e®ects with and without trimming of propensity scores as some
values are close to the boundaries. We consider two trimming levels, where response propensity
scores smaller than 5% (10%) and treatment propensity scores smaller than 5% (10%) or larger
than 95 % (90%) are trimmed to the respective threshold values.
Table 3 presents the results which are in line with the previous simulations. The bias of the
IPW estimator is moderate irrespective of the sample size and the trimming level, whereas it
amounts to roughly 1.8 SAT scores when taking mean di®erences. Yet, when considering the
smaller sample size, the mean di®erence estimator is superior w.r.t. the MSE as it is more precise
than IPW. However, as the sample size increases IPW increasingly outperforms mean di®erences.
We therefore conclude that weighting based on instruments is e®ective in reestablishing the va-
lidity of experiments under attrition on unobservables, at least when the sample size is not too
26small such that the gain in bias reduction outweighs the loss in precision due to the estimation of
the propensity scores and weighting. Of course, a precondition for this result is the availability
of a continuous instrument that is both relevant (su±ciently correlated with response behavior)
and valid (no direct e®ect on the outcome). Table 3 also reports the average numbers of trimmed
response and treatment propensity scores in the simulations, which are moderate even for the
10% trimming level.
Table 3: Attrition on unobservables, simulated data, zero treatment e®ect
n=500
^ ¢ bias s.e. MSE av. num. of trimmed p;¼
IPW unobs (untrimmed) 0.425 0.425 6.197 38.585
IPW unobs (5% trimming) 0.428 0.428 6.198 38.594 0.000, 16.191
IPW unobs (10% trimming) 0.443 0.443 6.200 38.631 0.452, 46.177
mean di®erence 1.768 1.768 5.420 32.389
true e®ect 0.000
n=2000
^ ¢ bias s.e. MSE av. num. of trimmed p;¼
IPW unobs (untrimmed) 0.411 0.411 2.994 9.134
IPW unobs (5% trimming) 0.412 0.412 2.994 9.137 0.000, 24.315
IPW unobs (10% trimming) 0.423 0.423 2.997 9.158 0.012, 142.857
mean di®erence 1.772 1.772 2.667 10.252
true e®ect 0.000
Note: 1999 Monte Carlo replications.
`IPW unobs' controls for attrition related to observables and unobservables.
6 Empirical application
We present an application of Propositions 2 and 3 (attrition related to observables) to a large
data set coming from a randomized experiment conducted to assess the Mexican universal health
insurance program `Seguro Popular'. These data have been collected, analyzed, and provided by
King, Gakidou, Imai, Lakin, Moore, Nall, Ravishankar, Vargas, Tellez-Rojo, Hernandez-Avila,
Hernandez-Avila, and Hernandez-Llamas (2009), see also King, Gakidou, Ravishankar, Moore,
Lakin, Vargas, Tellez-Rojo, Hernandez-Avila, Hernandez-Avila, and Hernandez-Llamas (2007)
for more details concerning the experimental design. According to the authors, one major goal
of Mexico's health insurance reform in 2003 was to provide quality care and health coverage
also to poor households, in particular to the (at that time) 50 million uninsured Mexicans. The
27target after completion of the roll-out was to increase total health spending in Mexico by a full
percentage point of the GDP (from 5.6% in 2002).
The data set provides information on 32,515 households, including socio-economic character-
istics (gender of the interviewee, education, household size, wealth, employment, etc.), health in-
surance coverage, detailed health information (both physical and mental), use of and spending on
health services, and many other factors. One member of each household was interviewed shortly
before the random assignment took place and roughly 10 months after the baseline survey to
measure the outcomes of interest. Note that the program assignment was randomized on the
regional level. 100 geographical health clusters were matched to each other in order to form sim-
ilar pairs w.r.t. important observed covariates. Then, randomization took place within cluster
pairs resulting in the matched-pair, cluster-randomization design discussed in Imai, King, and
Nall (2009).
In the subsequent discussion, we focus on the program's impact on symptoms re°ecting mental
health problems. A priori, we would expect the program to increase mental health for two
reasons. Firstly, we suspect that health coverage increases the recipients' probability to claim
and receive treatment against whatsoever health de¯ciencies. Secondly, the program may cover
health expenditures previously paid out of the households' own pockets. By easing the ¯nancial
burden the program may also reduce stress, anxiety, and other mental symptoms related to the
necessity to spend a substantial share of household income or wealth on health. The follow-up
survey contains four questions related to mental health that are measured on a scale from 1
(none) to 5 (extreme): sleeping problems, not feeling rested and fresh during the day, sadness or
depression, worry or anxiety.
As shown in Table 4, taking mean di®erences (and controlling for the fact that randomization
is clustered when computing standard errors) suggests that the program has some positive impact
on mental health, as it signi¯cantly reduces the severeness of the ¯rst, third, and fourth symptom.
However, the outcomes are only available for 28,015 individuals (86 % of those in the baseline
survey), as 4,500 did not answer the questions of interest in the follow-up survey. We therefore
28estimate the ATEs on respondents and on the entire population under the assumption of attrition
related to observables to check the robustness of the estimates. To be precise, we actually focus
on the intention to treat e®ect (ITT). I.e., we do not consider and/or control for non-compliance
w.r.t. the program assignment, which is beyond the scope of this paper.
Table 4: Means and mean di®erences in mental health outcomes
In the last 30 days, how much of a problem did you have av. treated av. non-tr. di®. p-value
...with sleeping 1.486 1.552 -0.067 0.036
...due to not feeling rested during the day 1.558 1.637 -0.079 0.038
...with feeling sad, low or depressed 1.740 1.808 -0.068 0.548
...with worry or anxiety 1.479 1.588 -0.108 0.051
Note: Standard errors account for clustering.
Estimating the ATE on respondents (¢R=1) requires us to control for all variables that a®ect
the mental health outcomes and are not balanced across the treatment states conditional on
response. It is well acknowledged in the literature that socio-economic variables such as education,
age, occupation, household composition, wealth, and income are strongly correlated with health
(see for instance Llena-Nozal, Lindeboom, and Portrait, 2004, and Mulatu and Schooler, 2002).
Furthermore, the pre-treatment health state (see Huber, Lechner, and Wunsch 2010) as well as
health behavior (e.g., alcohol consumption, smoking, possession of a health insurance plan, visits
to receive health care) are most likely further important confounders. Even regional factors such
as living in a rural or urban area and ethnicity might in°uence mental health.
Running a probit regression of the treatment state on the aforementioned characteristics re-
veals that only the possession of a health insurance plan prior to the treatment di®ers signi¯-
cantly (at the 5% level) across treated and nontreated respondents. The other variables are well
balanced. Table 5 presents the estimates for ¢R=1 when conditioning on health insurance in the
treatment propensity score. The estimator is based on the normalized sample analog of Propo-
sition 2 without trimming, as the problem of extreme propensity score values does not occur.
The e®ects are only slightly smaller than the mean di®erences presented in Table 4 and by no
means signi¯cantly di®erent from the latter. The standard errors are computed based on block
bootstrapping with 1999 replications which accounts for cluster randomization.
29To estimate the ATE on the entire population (¢), we check whether the aforementioned
variables that are likely to a®ect the health outcomes are also related to the response behavior.
This is indeed the case for gender, age, education, ethnicity, household size, health behavior,
and living in a rural/urban area. We therefore condition on these variables in a very °exible
way (by including dummies and interaction terms) when estimating the response propensity
score. The probit speci¯cation is provided in Appendix A.8. Interestingly, the coe±cients do not
di®er signi¯cantly across treatment states. This indicates that the di®erences in the observed
characteristics of respondents and the entire population are comparable conditional on D = 1
and D = 0, see the discussion of Assumption 3.
We use the normalized sample analog of Proposition 3, again without trimming, to estimate
the ATE. For the ¯rst, second, and fourth outcome (those with signi¯cant mean di®erences), the
estimates are somewhat smaller (e®ects decrease between 6.4% and 7.5% in absolute terms) than
the e®ects in Table 4. While being signi¯cant on the 5% level, the estimates are, however, not
signi¯cantly di®erent from the mean di®erences. Thus, the ATE of the health insurance program
`Seguro Popular' on mental health does not appear to vary importantly across the di®erent
covariate distributions of the respondents and the entire population.
Table 5: ATEs on respondents and the entire population
In the last 30 days, how much of a problem did you have ^ ¢R=1 p-value ^ ¢ p-value
...with sleeping -0.065 0.041 -0.062 0.031
...due to not feeling rested during the day -0.076 0.045 -0.074 0.026
...with feeling sad, low or depressed -0.071 0.530 -0.057 0.508
...with worry or anxiety -0.106 0.052 -0.101 0.006
Note: p-values are computed based on 1999 block bootstraps.
Attrition is assumed to depend on observables.
7 Conclusion
This paper discusses the identi¯cation of treatment e®ects in randomized experiments when
outcomes are only partially observed due to attrition and non-response in follow-up surveys. Its
¯rst contribution is the systematic coverage of various forms of attrition, i.e., when outcomes are
30missing completely at random and when attrition is related to observables (missing at random)
and unobservables. We treat these various forms by imposing di®erent assumptions on the relation
between the response behavior and the treatment, the observed covariates, and the unobserved
characteristics in a fairly general treatment e®ect model.
The second contribution is to show point identi¯cation of average treatment e®ects on the
respondents and on the entire population based on di®erent implementations of inverse probabil-
ity weighting (IPW). Each IPW method is tailored to a speci¯c nature of attrition considered,
which provides practitioners with straightforward solutions depending on the suspected missing
data problem. In particular, we introduce an IPW approach based on an instrumental variable
(IV) strategy to tackle attrition on unobservables, which was not considered in the experimental
literature before.
Despite its technical ease of implementation, the IV-based IPW approach appears to be rarely
applicable in social experiments conducted up to date, due to the lack of credible continuous in-
struments for attrition. This is unfortunate, as attrition on unobservables seems to be a potential
threat in many ¯elds of research where randomized trials take place (such as education and labor
economics), in particular when the number of observed baseline characteristics is low. Future
research might therefore consider the creation and random assignment of instruments in experi-
mental designs in order to validate and increase the credibility of experimental inference.
31A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
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jR = 1;X = x;D = 0
¸
¢ p(0;X)jD = 0
¸
= E [E [Y jR = 1;X = x;D = 1]jD = 1] ¡ E [E [Y jR = 1;X = x;D = 0]jD = 0]
= E [E [Y jX = x;D = 1]jD = 1] ¡ E [E [Y jX = x;D = 0]jD = 0]









The ¯rst equality follows from the law of iterated expectations, the fourth from Assumption 3, implying that Y
and R are independent conditional on (X;D). The ¯fth follows from a backward application of the law of iterated
expectations, and the sixth equality follows from the randomization of the treatment.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
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The ¯rst equality follows from the law of iterated expectations, the fourth from Assumption 4, implying that Y
and R are independent conditional on (X;D). The ¯fth follows from the randomization of the treatment and the
sixth equality follows from a backward application of the law of iterated expectations.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Under Assumptions 3', 4, and 4', the ATE is identi¯ed by
¢ = E
·
R ¢ D ¢ Y
p(D;X) ¢ ¼(X)
¡
R ¢ (1 ¡ D) ¢ Y






R ¢ D ¢ Y
p(D;X) ¢ ¼(X)
¡
R ¢ (1 ¡ D) ¢ Y














R ¢ (1 ¡ D) ¢ Y









jR = 1;D = 1;X = x
¸







p(D;X) ¢ (1 ¡ ¼(X))
jR = 1;D = 0;X = x
¸
¢ p(D;X) ¢ (1 ¡ ¼(X))
¸
= E [E [Y jR = 1;D = 1;X = x]] ¡ E [E [Y jR = 1;D = 0;X = x]]
























33The ¯rst equality follows from the law of iterated expectations, the fourth from Assumption 4, implying that Y
and R are independent conditional on (X;D). The ¯fth follows from the randomization of the treatment and the
sixth equality follows from a backward application of the law of iterated expectations.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4









(1 ¡ D) ¢ Y
1 ¡ ¼(X;p(W))












(1 ¡ D) ¢ Y
(1 ¡ ¼(X;p(W)))






































jD = 0;X;p(W);R = 1
¸
¢ (1 ¡ ¼(X;p(W)))jp(W);R = 1
¸


































[¢R=1(X;p(W))jp(W);R = 1] j R = 1
i
= ¢R=1:
The ¯rst equality follows from the law of iterated expectations, the fourth from Assumptions 5 and 5'.
¢R=1(X;p(W)) denotes the conditional ATE given X and p(W) in the selected subpopulation. Finally, the last
equality is a backward application of the law of iterated expectations.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 5
Under Assumptions 5, 5', and 5", the ATE is identi¯ed by
¢ = E
·





R ¢ (1 ¡ D) ¢ Y











R ¢ (1 ¡ D) ¢ Y










R ¢ D ¢ Y
p(W) ¢ ¼(X;p(W))
¡
R ¢ (1 ¡ D) ¢ Y
















(1 ¡ D) ¢ Y







































jD = 0;R = 1;X;p(W)
¸











































The ¯rst equality follows from the law of iterated expectations, the sixth from Assumptions 5 and 5'. The eighth
equality follows from Assumption (5'c) by which FUjD=d;X=x;p(W)=p(w);R=r = FUjX=x;p(W)=p(w);R=r and Assump-
tion (5"c) which imposes additivity of observed and unobserved terms. Both together imply that ¢R=1(X;p(W)),
the conditional ATE given X and p(W) among respondents, is equal to ¢R=0(X;p(W)) and thus, ¢(X;p(W)).
Finally, the last equality is a backward application of the law of iterated expectations.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 6









(1 ¡ D) ¢ Y
1 ¡ ¼(p(D;Z))












(1 ¡ D) ¢ Y
(1 ¡ ¼(p(D;Z)))




























jD = 0;p(D;Z);R = 1
¸
¢ (1 ¡ ¼(p(D;Z))) j R = 1
¸













j R = 1
¤
= E [¢R=1(p(D;Z)) j R = 1] = ¢R=1:
The ¯rst equality follows from the law of iterated expectations, the fourth from Assumptions 6 and 6'.
¢R=1(X;p(W)) denotes the conditional ATE given p(D;Z) in the selected subpopulation. Finally, the last
equality is a backward application of the law of iterated expectations.
A.7 Proof of Proposition 7
Under Assumptions 6, 6', and 6", the ATE is identi¯ed by
¢ = E
·





R ¢ (1 ¡ D) ¢ Y











R ¢ (1 ¡ D) ¢ Y






R ¢ D ¢ Y
p(D;Z) ¢ ¼(p(D;Z))
¡
R ¢ (1 ¡ D) ¢ Y










(1 ¡ D) ¢ Y





























jD = 0;R = 1;p(D;Z)
¸


















= E [¢R=1(p(D;Z))jp(D;Z)] = E [¢(p(D;Z))jp(D;Z)] = ¢;
36The ¯rst equality follows from the law of iterated expectations, the sixth from Assumptions 6 and 6'. The eighth
equality follows from Assumption (6'c) by which ¢R=1(p(D;Z)), the conditional ATE given p(D;Z) among re-
spondents, is equal to ¢R=0(X;p(D;Z)) and thus, ¢(p(D;Z)). Finally, the last equality is a backward application
of the law of iterated expectations.
37A.8 Speci¯cation of the response propensity score
Table 6: Probit speci¯cation of the response propensity score
variable coe±cient (s.e.) p-value
age 0.069 (0.012) 0.000
age squared -0.001 (0.000) 0.000
age < 20 0.812 (0.257) 0.002
age btw. 20 and 25 0.489 (0.201) 0.015
age btw. 26 and 30 0.539 (0.162) 0.001
age btw. 31 and 35 0.446 (0.129) 0.001
age btw. 36 and 40 0.346 (0.100) 0.001
age btw. 41 and 45 0.198 (0.085) 0.020
age btw. 46 and 50 0.126 (0.075) 0.091
age btw. 51 and 55 0.095 (0.072) 0.187
missing age 1.794 (0.462) 0.000
gender 0.069 (0.076) 0.368
missing gender -0.764 (0.430) 0.076
indigenous 0.107 (0.062) 0.082
missing ethnicity -0.390 (0.156) 0.013
education: secondary -0.074 (0.026) 0.005
education: preparatory/vocational -0.106 (0.037) 0.004
education: normal -0.251 (0.062) 0.000
education: technical/commercial -0.255 (0.083) 0.002
missing education -0.224 (0.160) 0.162
household size: 1 -0.369 (0.055) 0.000
household size: 2 -0.189 (0.032) 0.000
household size: 3 -0.101 (0.025) 0.000
household educ: secondary -0.098 (0.040) 0.015
household educ: prep./voc. -0.300 (0.065) 0.000
household educ: techn./comm. -0.217 (0.167) 0.193
missing household educ -0.033 (0.055) 0.550
ever outpatient health care 0.122 (0.028) 0.000
smoker -0.083 (0.035) 0.019
missing smoker -0.069 (0.088) 0.435
using seatbelt when in a car -0.215 (0.050) 0.000
missing seatbelt -0.069 (0.036) 0.057
urban/rural 0.552 (0.108) 0.000
gender*age < 20 -0.224 (0.093) 0.015
gender*age btw. 20 and 25 -0.187 (0.080) 0.019
gender*age btw. 26 and 30 -0.467 (0.082) 0.000
gender*age btw. 31 and 35 -0.424 (0.082) 0.000
gender*age btw. 36 and 40 -0.346 (0.077) 0.000
gender*age btw. 41 and 45 -0.299 (0.082) 0.000
gender*age btw. 46 and 50 -0.214 (0.079) 0.007
gender*age btw. 51 and 55 -0.211 (0.088) 0.016
gender*using seatbelt 0.147 (0.050) 0.003
gender*urban/rural -0.176 (0.066) 0.008
using seatbelt*age < 20 0.240 (0.127) 0.058
urban/rural*age < 20 -0.376 (0.098) 0.000
constant -1.077 (0.427) 0.012
Note: Standard errors (s.e.) account for clustering. Pseudo-R2=0.081.
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